Please copy and paste the full letter text below into your email and include your full name, ward/city, and (optionally) your ID number and the date in the [Your Full Name] [Your Ward/City] [Optional: ID Number] [Date] in the introduction.

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Dear Speaker and Honourable Members of Parliament,

Please find below a formal citizen submission titled:

“Urgent Request: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Executive Overreach – Formal Public Submission (18–20 July 2025).”

This letter is being sent by concerned South Africans across the country during a coordinated 72-hour window: 18 to 20 July 2025.

I respectfully request your urgent attention in line with Sections 56(d), 59(1)(a), 33, and 1(c) of the Constitution.

Sincerely,

[Your Full Name]

[Your Ward/City]

[Optional: ID Number]

[Date]

To:

The Speaker of the National Assembly and Members of the following Parliamentary Committees:

• Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development

• Standing Committee on Finance

• Standing Committee on Appropriations

• Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA)

• Constitutional Review Committee

Dear Honourable Members of Parliament,

I am one of many South Africans submitting this identical letter within 7 days since the President’s announcement. Please treat this as a formal and coordinated public concern.

As a concerned citizen of the Republic of South Africa, I write to raise urgent constitutional concerns regarding what I believe to be a dangerous pattern of executive overreach.

Parliament has in the past been found wanting in its constitutional oversight role. I write today not to criticise, but to urge that this moment be remembered as one in which Parliament rose to the occasion and fulfilled its duty to the nation.

This submission is made under my rights in terms of Sections 56(d), 59(1)(a), 33, and 1(c) of the Constitution, which entitle citizens to petition Parliament, demand public involvement in oversight, expect just administrative action, and insist that all government conduct complies with the Constitution and the rule of law.

I raise two matters that require your urgent attention:

1. The Expanding Use of “Leave of Absence” Without Constitutional Basis

On 13 July 2025, the President placed the Minister of Police on a “leave of absence” following serious allegations involving obstruction of justice, political interference, and high-level criminal syndicates.

This particular leave of absence was declared shortly after formal criminal charges were laid against the Minister for allegedly misleading Parliament — and just as committees began preparing oversight action.

While the term “leave of absence” has been used in previous instances, its meaning has never been formally defined, nor has it been tested against the Constitution. There is:

• No law or policy framework authorising a “leave of absence” for Cabinet members in lieu of formal suspension or accountability;

• No constitutional provision that recognises “leave of absence” as a category of executive action under Section 92 or 96;

• A growing risk that this term is being used to simulate accountability without activating lawful processes.

In contrast, Section 92(2) of the Constitution states plainly:

"Members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions."

This creates a legal vacuum: ministers step aside without accountability, and Parliament is sidelined.

As a citizen, I hold Acting Deputy Chief Justice Madlanga in the highest regard — which is precisely why I find this moment so troubling. It is difficult to reconcile the gravity of appointing such a senior and revered jurist with the President’s simultaneous unwillingness to initiate even a basic formal process such as suspension. If the allegations are serious enough to involve one of the most respected constitutional figures in the land, surely they are serious enough to warrant the minimum threshold of executive action. The current approach risks diminishing both the dignity of the Court and the integrity of the Executive, by engaging the Judiciary to act where the President appears unwilling to.

This particular leave of absence was declared just as formal criminal complaints were being laid by Members of Parliament from across party lines — including the DA, EFF, and MK Party — for allegedly misleading Parliament and obstructing justice. Committees had already begun engaging the matter when the Executive’s announcement created pressure to defer to an executive-led process — a development that risked compromising Parliament’s independent oversight role, even though the committees have commendably continued their work.

This sequence of events raises a serious constitutional concern regarding the separation of powers. Parliament has a distinct and independent oversight mandate that must not be subordinated to executive timing or announcements. The President’s decision to announce a judicial commission—featuring a sitting judge and delivered via national media—had the practical effect of shifting public attention and institutional focus away from Parliament.

While commissions of inquiry may have a role to play, Section 165(2) of the Constitution guarantees that

"the courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law."

Judicial commissions should not be engaged by executive announcement in ways that risk appearing to displace or neutralise the rightful oversight role of Parliament.

While the President did state that the final report of the Commission would be sent to the Speaker and the Chief Justice, this retrospective gesture does not remedy the fact that Parliament was not substantively acknowledged at the time of the announcement. At that moment, multiple parties in Parliament had already lodged criminal complaints and initiated oversight processes. Instead of aligning the Commission with those efforts or publicly recognising Parliament’s active role, the announcement framed the Executive as taking sole control of the matter. Paired with the undefined term “leave of absence” and the stature of a sitting Constitutional Court justice, this approach had the combined effect of displacing formal parliamentary oversight with an executive-led alternative.

In a constitutional democracy, legality must take precedence over appearances. The Constitution does not permit the substitution of public accountability with high-profile announcements that bypass the legislative process.

2. The National Dialogue as an Unmandated Executive Process

The Presidency has also undertaken a National Dialogue process on matters of national importance, without a formal parliamentary mandate or statutory oversight. While public dialogue is vital in any democracy, this particular process:

• Was not established by legislation or parliamentary resolution;

• Operates without formal oversight or public accountability, despite engaging in high-level political themes;

• May involve public funding without legislative appropriation or transparency — a figure between R700 million and R740 million has been cited in the media as the anticipated cost of the National Dialogue. Yet this amount appears to have been announced without formal Cabinet approval or prior parliamentary authorisation.

• Risks substituting Parliamentary deliberation with elite-driven, informally structured, and unaccountable engagements.

Furthermore, when Members of Parliament from within the Government of National Unity (GNU) withdrew from the process—citing concerns over its lack of formal mandate—the Presidency publicly accused them of having “turned their backs against the people of South Africa.”

This response reframed a lawful constitutional objection as disloyalty to “the people of South Africa” — yet in a constitutional democracy, the People speak through Parliament. When public dissent is redirected toward informal executive platforms and Parliament is bypassed or sidelined, it not only undermines oversight, but also harms the very citizens who placed their trust in this House as their primary voice.

This submission is not intended to undermine Parliament, but to express concern that its role is being undermined — and that erodes the dignity of both this House and the public it serves.

Before concluding, I wish to commend Parliament — particularly the relevant committees — for continuing its oversight role despite the establishment of the Madlanga Commission. Their willingness to proceed with discussions affirms that Parliament’s constitutional mandate to scrutinise the Executive does not lapse simply because a judicial commission is announced. This is a welcome sign of institutional independence and must be applauded.

I respectfully request that the same principle be applied to the Presidency’s National Dialogue process, which — like the Madlanga Commission — was not established by law, yet has direct implications for national governance. Parliamentary scrutiny is just as vital here, to ensure that no public process is allowed to grow beyond the bounds of democratic accountability.

I respectfully request the following:

1. That the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development hold a public hearing into the legality and constitutional status of the “leave of absence” mechanism, including whether it allows the Executive to evade formal accountability procedures;

2. That Parliament seek formal clarity from the Presidency and Judiciary on the scope and limits of judicial commissions initiated outside legal or disciplinary frameworks — including whether such commissions may override or delay the work of parliamentary committees;

3. That the legal status, scope, funding sources, and departmental involvement in the National Dialogue be reviewed by the relevant oversight and finance committees — including disclosure of:

   • Which departments are funding or coordinating the process;

   • What costs have already been incurred or approved;

   • Whether procurement rules have been followed;

   • Who authorised the appointment of “Eminent Persons” and under what legal framework;

   • Whether the process received formal Cabinet or parliamentary authorisation.

4. That Parliament affirm — by resolution or committee statement — that governance must remain subject to lawful, transparent, and constitutional procedures, and that no informal process or elite-led initiative may substitute the authority of this House or undermine its role in a representative democracy.

If Parliament does not intervene at this stage, these informal practices may harden into precedent — quietly reshaping democratic governance without formal amendment, public debate, or legal scrutiny. Before such practices become constitutional convention through repetition, I urge Parliament to scrutinise what they actually mean in law — and whether they align with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Governance in a constitutional democracy must not be allowed to drift from formal legality into vague or improvised executive constructs. Even widely accepted phrases must be checked for their constitutional meaning before they are allowed to set precedent.

This concern is not hypothetical. In EFF & Others v Speaker of the National Assembly (2017), the Constitutional Court found that Parliament had failed to fulfil its constitutional obligation to hold the Executive accountable. The Court emphasised that it is not enough for Parliament to have oversight mechanisms on paper — it must activate them in practice, especially when credible allegations arise.

Today, we face a similar risk: that executive actions — like placing a minister on “leave of absence” or creating parallel governance processes like the National Dialogue — may pre-empt, delay, or substitute the work of Parliament. I urge Parliament not to repeat the mistake for which it has already been found wanting.

As Nelson Mandela once cautioned:

“We were mindful from the very start of the importance of accountability to democracy. Our experience had made us acutely aware of the possible dangers of a government that is neither transparent nor accountable. To this end, our Constitution contains several mechanisms to ensure that government will not be part of the problem, but part of the solution.”

— Nelson Mandela, African Regional Workshop of the International Ombudsman Institute, Pretoria, 26 August 1996

This submission opens on 18 July, Mandela Day — a date on which we honour the values of dignity, accountability, and democratic integrity that Mandela stood for. It is in that same spirit that we now call upon Parliament to defend constitutional governance, resist informal overreach, and uphold the institutional legacy Mandela entrusted to this House.

This letter is submitted in good faith and in the interest of protecting the rule of law, the dignity of our institutions, and the proper separation of powers in our constitutional democracy.

I make this submission not in partisan anger, but in constitutional conscience — trusting Parliament to uphold its duty as guardian of the people’s sovereignty.